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Sibling interactionAmong the population of the Krummhörn region (Ostfriesland, Germany) in the 18th and 19th centuries, the
death of the father in the family led on average to the accelerated marriage of his children. Three evolutionary
explanations are offered for this “paternal absence” effect in the literature: namely, (i) the assumption of an adap-
tive “psychosocial acceleration” of the children with prepubertal experience of uncertainty; (ii) an opportunistic
adjustment of life and reproduction decisions as an adaptive reaction to the personal cost–beneﬁt balances that
are changed by the father's death; and (iii) given the genetic parent–offspring conﬂict, an increase in the repro-
ductive autonomy of offspring after the loss of the dominant father ﬁgure. Our models, which are based on the
analyses of the vital statistics data derived from church registers and tax rolls and compiled into a family recon-
stitution study, attribute the greatest explanatory power for the patterns found in the Krummhörn to the oppor-
tunistic adjustment approach (ii).
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Paternal absence frequently accelerates the transition of juveniles to
their reproductive life phase (see Shenk, Starkweather, Kress, & Alam,
2013 and Sheppard, Snopkowski, & Sear, 2014 for recent overviews).
Scholars have often assumed that this phenomenon is themanifestation
of adaptive regulation, although it is not clear what evolutionary func-
tional logic would be responsible for this pattern. We discuss three the-
oretical approaches that take a position on this issue, but provide
explanations that point in three different directions.
The theoretical model offered by Draper and Harpending (1982) has
had a lasting inﬂuence on later research. The absence of the father in the
life of a developing child initiates a developmental track with conse-
quences for the child's reproductive strategy in adulthood. Belsky,
Steinberg, and Draper (1991); Ellis (2004); Chisholm (1993) and others
further differentiated this approach, sharpening it into the hypothesis
that children accelerate their reproductive pathway as an adaptive re-
sponse to early life stress and unpredictability, and are thereby reacting
to external life and survival risks that they cannot efﬁciently manage
(see Brumbach, Figueredo, & Ellis, 2009 for a full account of this. Voland),
. This is an open access article underargument and Webster, Graber, Gesselman, Crosier, & Schember, 2014
for a meta-analysis of the strengths of this effect.) Recently, Rickard,
Frankenhuis, and Nettle (2014) have proposed augmenting the “exter-
nal prediction model”with an “internal prediction model.” The authors
argued that early adversity may negatively affect reproductive value by
increasing latermorbidity andmortality. Despite these differences, both
prediction models assume that an individual's prepubertal life experi-
ences affect his or her adult life and reproductive strategies. These effects
are implemented through adaptive developmental plasticity (Nettle &
Bateson, 2015). In the following, we refer to this line of argumentation
as the “psychosocial acceleration” (Ellis, 2004) explanation attempt.
However, it could also be the case that an acceleration of a child's life
history after the death of his or her father is directly connected to the
loss of solid social transactions between the father and his offspring;
i.e., in the broadest sense to the loss of paternal investment (Scelza,
2010; Sheppard et al., 2014), and to the resulting changes in the dynam-
ics of the family as awhole. Intrafamilial resource ﬂows changewith the
death of a member of the family network, and this leads to a re-
evaluation of the cost–beneﬁt balances of various behavioral options.
A child's decision about whether to remain with the family as a helper
or to independently reproduce could be affected by such an event, and
could be revised in favor of (or even against) his or her own reproduc-
tion. In line with the view of the human family as a manifestation of a
cooperative breeding system, effects of this kind should be inﬂuenced
by the family's resources as well as by their size and composition, as
all of these factors are likely to affect the individual cost–beneﬁtthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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this line of argumentation as “opportunistic reproductive decision-
making.” The basic assumption is that reproductive strategy decisions
will be made conditionally within the conﬁnes of the direct time hori-
zon; i.e., that these decisions will be made opportunistically, with no
long-term physiological regulation being necessary.
An acceleration of themarriage age based on the logic of opportunistic
reproductive decision-making differs in a subtleway froman acceleration
of the age at marriage as a reaction to a parent–offspring conﬂict that has
been eased with the death of the father. Although both decision-making
processes are aimed at the optimization of the child's personal cost–
beneﬁt balance, they differ in their assumptions about the role of the fa-
ther, and thus about the consequences of his death for the child's own
life history. In their classic papers, Trivers (1974) and Emlen (1982)
have already pointed out that the genetic parent–offspring conﬂict not
only manifested itself in differential parental investment, but also in ten-
dencies toward reciprocalmanipulation; this involved inﬂuencing the be-
havior of the respective other party for one's own beneﬁt.
The crucial question here iswhether the father had played amore sup-
portive or a more restrictive role in the child's life. After all, a father is not
just an investor of caloric and social resources in his family, which could
favor his children's transition into marriage; he may also be the manager
of his own interests in the reproductive decisions of his offspring, which
could make the transition of his children into marriage more difﬁcult
(Apostolou, 2014). It cannot be ruled out that children gain greater repro-
ductive autonomy after the loss of their father, and may therefore enter
into a marriage because they have less need to align their own interests
with those of their father. The essential element of this assumption is
that the intrafamilial “helper conﬂict” (Voland, 2014) becomes far less pro-
nouncedwhen the father is absent. In the following, we refer to this line of
argumentation as the “parent-offspring conﬂict” explanation attempt.
The three explanatorymodels mentioned above are based in part on
different assumptions and requirements. The psychosocial acceleration
explanation attempt assumes that the child experiences the loss of his
or her father at a young age (Belsky et al., 1991), and that there are no
signiﬁcant differences between the socioeconomic groups of a popula-
tion. Even if the developmental morbidity proﬁles of children might
be affected differently by a paternal loss - depending on their socioeco-
nomic group - yet we do not expect any noteworthy differences be-
tween the social groups for the Krummhörn at least. The life situations
were too similar with respect to the extrinsic conditions, such as patho-
genic stress and calorie intake, for this to have led to signiﬁcant social
differences in the psychosocial acceleration. Of course, we are not ruling
out the possibility that Rickard et al.'s (2014) “internal prediction
model” couldmatter, in a very subtle and complexway, for social differ-
ences in psychosocial acceleration even in theKrummhörn. The result of
our explorative study will help to assess how big the probability of this
is. However, we are assuming, for the time being, that paternal loss
should have a similar impact in every social stratum. On the other
hand, the explanation attempt that relies on opportunistic reproductive
decision-making focuses on the loss of a father during, and, in particular,
after adolescence; i.e., during the life phase when marriage options are
increasingly being contemplated in any case. Furthermore, this attempt
is sensitive to the social situation of the families, and especially the re-
source situation. If in a farmer family a “breeding position” became va-
cant because the father died, the father's heir and successor was more
likely to marry. As running a farm involved importing female working
power into the business, it was generally considered necessary for the
heir to marry. Moreover, the situation in a given family would have
been inﬂuenced by the sibling composition of a family, as this would
have been a crucial component of economic performance, and thus of
the family's pooled energy budget (Kramer, Greaves, & Ellison, 2009;
Reiches et al., 2009). As facultative cooperative breeders, young adults
were faced with the trade-off of remaining in their natal family as a
helper or commencingwith their own reproduction. The death of the fa-
ther in the family likely had a lasting impact on the child's decisionabout whether to remain a helper or to become a breeder, and hence
on his or her age at marriage as well.
Finally, while the parent–offspring conﬂict explanation attempt is ag-
nostic with regard to the time of paternal loss, we expect to see socioeco-
nomic group differences. Given the interdependence of economic and
reproductive interests and paternal dominance, parental expectations
regarding the lifestyle of the children were likely more strongly pro-
nounced in resource-holding families than in non-resource-holding fam-
ilies (Van den Berg, Fawcett, Buunk, & Weissing, 2013). Among these
expectations were that children follow the guidance of their parents in
terms of mate selection and the timing of marriage. Van den Berg et al.
(2013) predicted that parent–child conﬂicts would have been most pro-
nouncedwhen fathers, as opposed tomothers, controlled resource allocation.
Among the potential reasons for the intergenerational conﬂicts that
arose in the population under investigation here—namely, the population
of C18-C19 Krummhörn—is that lifetime reproductive success depended
to a substantial degree on the family's social standing and resources
(Voland, 1990), but the systemof inheritance called for theunequal distri-
bution of family resources among the children. As a rule, the youngest son
acquired the agricultural holding (“ultimogeniture”), whereas his siblings
were compensated with cash and equivalents in kind. This process was
sometimes drawnout formanyyears, and in some cases even for decades,
depending on the economic efﬁciency of the farm. Generally, this meant
that the other heirs had to leave the privileged life situation of their
natal family, and thus experienced a social decline that may have led
them to undertake long-distance emigration. Given this cultural practice,
the parent–offspring conﬂict is obvious: a father had an interest in eco-
nomically reinforcing possession of the farm as a guarantee of dynamic
persistence, and expected to receive in return contributions from his chil-
dren, such as productive labor and altruistic demonstrations of family sol-
idarity. In light of these expectations, the children may have strategically
delayed starting a family or a household. But if their father died, these re-
strictions on the children's personal autonomy were reduced.
On the other hand, we would expect to ﬁnd that the family's sibling
composition had no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on an individual child, because
as a rule the presence of siblings had no restrictive effects on reproduc-
tive autonomy. Although it is conceivable that sibling conﬂicts would
have broken out with the loss of the father, and that such conﬂicts
could have affected the reproductive decisions of the individuals in-
volved, these decisions were not forced by the pressure of intrafamilial
dominance, but were insteadmade as the result of each child's personal
cost–beneﬁt analysis. The followingmatrix, whichdisplays assumptions
concerning the timing, the resources, and sibship inﬂuences on the pa-
ternal absence effect, is derived from the three lines of argumentation
(Table 1), the empirical examination of which should allow us to devel-
op for the Krummhörn case a differentiated assessment of the function-
al reasons of the association between paternal loss and the accelerated
transition into the reproductive life phase.
The analytical distinction between the three explanation attempts is,
admittedly, theoretically vague. After all, they certainly do not rule each
other out, and any empirical correlations found can be attributed to var-
ious explanations. Opportunistic life and reproductive decisions may,
for example, be made in response to both personal early experiences
of stress and intrafamilial conﬂicts. This lack of theoretical clarity pre-
vents the formation of speciﬁc hypotheses, which would be desirable
as such. Instead, the analysis must rely on the handling of the expecta-
tions, which are very broad.Whereas they tend to be narrow for the ex-
planation attempts of psychosocial acceleration and of the parent–
offspring conﬂict, they tend to have a broader scope with regard to
the opportunistic reproductive decisions model. In addition, the litera-
ture offers various formalizations of the parent–offspring conﬂict and
of the psychosocial acceleration model, which in part make predictions
that are partially in line with what we are calling the opportunistic re-
productive decision making model. In short: The differentiation be-
tween the three explanation attempts is certainly not as sharp as it
may appear.
Table 1
Expected correlations between paternal death and the accelerated transition into the reproductive life phase for three evolutionary explanation attempts.
Interaction with…
Explanation attempt Time of the loss of the father Socioeconomic status N of sisters and brothers
Psychosocial acceleration Yes (only prepubertal loss is effective) No No
Opportunistic reproductive decision making Yes (in particular postpubertal loss is effective) Yes Yes
Parent/Offspring conﬂict No assumption Yes No
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essarily be an explorative analysis that leads to the formation of hypoth-
eses, rather than an explanatory analysis that tests hypotheses. It is the
aim of “exploratory data analysis” to assess using statistical procedures
assumptions on which empirical relationships can be based given the
available data. We believe that the existing theories and empirical
knowledge are not sufﬁcient to allow us to clearly and unequivocally
formulate speciﬁc a priori hypotheses. Family dynamics are simply too
complex for straightforward predictions. For instance, after paternal
death, the number of siblings in the family could either accelerate or de-
celerate the transition intomarriage, depending on other features of the
family's situation. This uncertainty does not allow for serious hypothe-
ses to be generated. Therefore, we have chosen to follow an exploratory
data analysis approach in trying to deﬁne an expectation frame for our
analysis in Table 1.
The church register entries from the 33 Krummhörn parishes, to-
gether with information from the local tax rolls, have been compiled
through a family reconstitution study, and these data permit us to ana-
lyze complex family networks. In this population, paternal presence can
be assumed as long as no entry of death is documented in the registers.
Although divorce was legally available, marital dissolutions were per-
mitted only under exceptional conditions, and thus very seldom hap-
pened in practice. Occasionally, the abandonment of the family by a
husband was reported, but this phenomenon was also quantitatively
extremely marginal. Paternal absence due to work mobility is a bit
more difﬁcult to assess. Although the population of the Krummhörn
seems to have been producing a demographic surplus, which led to
the emigration of single individuals or whole families (such as in con-
nection with long-distance migration to America), the demand for
labor was strong in the proﬁtable agricultural economy of this fertile
marsh region. It therefore appears highly likely thatmost of themarried
men in this region were able to ﬁnd work close to home, and that the
permanent absence of fathers for reasons of seasonal work migration
was not a signiﬁcant factor. Accordingly, we assume that if the father
did not die, he was present in the family; thus we believe that the cir-
cumstances on which we base our analysis are very close to reﬂecting
the lived reality of this population.
In sum, the goal of this study is to identify the factors in the pre-
modern Krummhörn population thatmoderated the association between
the death of a father and the timing of the ﬁrst marriages of his offspring.
We examine three evolutionary theoretical approaches that attempt to
explain the effects with different emphases in order to determine which
of these attempts have the greatest explanatory power for the effects
found among the 18th- and 19th-century residents of the Krummhörn.
2. Methods
2.1. The population of the Krummhörn region in the 18th and 19th centuries
The historical Krummhörn region (Ostfriesland, a coastal region in
northwestern Germany) consists of 33 parishes. For all of these par-
ishes, the church register entries and the information from the tax
rolls are available in the format of a family reconstitution (Voland,
2000). The historical population of the Krummhörn region was an agri-
cultural society in which a few wealthy families owned the majority of
the farmland (for details, seeWillführ& Störmer, 2015).We categorized
families into ﬁve groups based on their landownership. The familieswho ownedmore than 75 grasen of farmland (1 gras ~0.36 ha) are clas-
siﬁed as large-scale farmers. The threshold of 75 grasen is arbitrary, but
is based on the deﬁnitions of the social and economic upper class found
in historical sources (for references, see Beise, 2001: pp. 53). The fami-
lies who owned less than 75 but more than 10 grasen are categorized
as mid-scale farmers, while those who owned less than 10 grasen are
classiﬁed as small-scale famers. Families who owned no land are
grouped in the fourth category, and those for whom the landownership
status is unknown are grouped in the ﬁfth category.
Therewere no urban settlements in the study area, although the city
of Emden directly bordered theKrummhörn, and likely exerted a demo-
graphic pulling effect in its immediate vicinity. The impact of this effect
is likely to have been limited because themarsh soilwas very fertile, and
was suitable for raising both crops and livestock. During the period
under study there were no famines or wars. The settlement of the
area had been completed by the late medieval era (Ohling, 1963). Due
to the geographic limits of this region imposed by theNorth Sea and for-
merly impassablemoor landscapes, there was no signiﬁcant population
growth during the period under study. Therefore, whereas the popula-
tion increased in most of Germany during the 19th century, including
in other parts of Ostfriesland, the population remained relatively stable
in the Krummhörn region.
2.2. Data selection and study period
We included children who were born within marriages contracted
after 1720, the point after which church registers could be regarded as
being acceptably accurate (N = 76,741). The children who were not
the offspring of a ﬁrst marriage of both spouses were excluded
(32,815 cases deleted), as the levels of parental investment often vary
between children fromdifferentmarriages due to the altering of kinship
relations (Willführ & Gagnon, 2013). A further selection criterion was
that the reproductive career of the natal family had to be completely
known. This criterion was fulﬁlled if the dates for the beginning and
end of a marriage (i.e., the death of one spouse and the survival of the
other) are exactly known (17,763 cases deleted). Starting in 1874 the
churches were no longer responsible for maintaining the birth, death,
and marriage registers, as these tasks were assigned to the civil admin-
istration. We therefore have to censor all cases after 1874 in order to
avoid selection biases.
Based on the ﬁndings of Willführ and Störmer (2015), who showed
that the age at ﬁrst marriage differed substantially between the social
strata, we have chosen to control for the family's social rank in the
models. However, since information from the tax rolls about landown-
ership and social status is only comprehensively available for marriages
contracted between 1720 and 1810, our models are restricted to the
children born in marriages contracted within this time period. The
aforementioned data selection criteria result in a sample containing
17,368 individuals. After excluding the cases with missing data on an
individual's sex (118 cases deleted), the exact date of birth (123 cases
deleted), the exact date of marriage (446 cases deleted), marital status
(394 cases deleted), and the exact death dates of the parents (143
cases deleted), our ﬁnal sample included 8296 boys and 7855 girls
from 3467 families. However, 2531 of the boys and 2306 of the girls in
the sample died before the age of 15. Moreover, 1883 of the boys and
1637 of the girls emigrated out of the study area. It may be assumed
that an individual emigrated if, despite the completeness of the sources,
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the emigration of children independent of their parents can be deemed
improbable, we assume that the children concerned lived in their natal
families at least until their 15th birthday. After reaching age 15 they are
removed from observation. The marital status of the remaining 3882
boys and 3912 girls after the age of 15 is known: 2908 boys and 3237
girls were married, and 974 boys and 675 girls died as single adults.12.3. Analytical methods
Wemodeled the life courses of the boys and girls separately, starting
from birth until their ﬁrst marriage (or until they were censored due to
death or emigration, respectively) by using the Cox proportional hazard
model (Cox, 1972). The events experienced by the individuals, such as
the births and deaths of siblings or paternal and maternal loss, are
coded as time-varying covariates. Thus, the models include information
on the number of living older and younger siblings and the vital status of
their parents at every age for each individual.
Four different models are estimated in order to investigate the
timing effects in response to paternal loss. In all four models, the
death of the father is coded as the dummy variable that differs depend-
ing on the child's age at the time of the paternal loss. Model A includes
the information on paternal death at every age of a child, while model B
only considers paternal loss before the age of ﬁve, and equates paternal
loss after the age of ﬁve with no paternal loss. Similarly, model C only
considers paternal loss between the ages of ﬁve and 15, and model D
only considers paternal death after the age of 15.We opted for the cutoff
at age 15 to capture possible puberty effects. Moreover, as age 15 is the
youngest female age at marriage in the Krummhörn, we assume that
this birthday marks a signiﬁcant life history transition point. Before
choosing the cutoff point between childhood and adolescence we con-
ducted analyses with varying age limits, but these analyses showed no
effects that would have justiﬁed a deviation from the conventional age
classiﬁcation in terms of population biology and demography. All of
themodels have been checked for a violation of the proportional hazard
assumption, and, if the assumption was found to be violated, have been
corrected by including the interaction of the respective covariate with
age or time. In addition to the time-varying covariates, such as the num-
ber of siblings, paternal death, and maternal death; we included infor-
mation on birth order andmaternal and paternal age at the child's birth.
In addition, all of themodels (A, B, C, andD) are compiled in different
versions with respect to the inclusion of confounding covariates. Model
version I is a minimal model and consists of the respective dummy var-
iable coding for paternal loss (A, B, C, and D), and includes the child's
birth order and the birth cohort as controls. In addition to the child's
birth order and the birth cohort, model version II includes the social
rank of the parents, the paternal age and the maternal age at the child's
birth, and further time-varying covariates on the mother's life status
and on the number of older and younger sisters and brothers, respec-
tively. To investigate whether paternal loss affects the age at marriage
of the father's children differently across social strata, we used model
version III to estimate the interaction between social strata and paternal
loss effects. Additionally, we estimated a series of family ﬁxed-effects
models based on a sibling comparison (model IV). Through the sibling
comparison, all of the observed and the unobserved environmental
and biological factors shared by the siblings are controlled for in the
model (Allison, 2009). For example, characteristics such as parental so-
cioeconomic status, cognitive ability, or parental personality were, to
the extent that they did not vary between siblings, controlled for.1 Based on these numbers the percentage of individuals who were never married was
25.1% for males and 17.3% for females. While these estimates are higher than expected,
they are based on individuals who survived to at least age 15. If the estimates are based
on ever-married and single IDs who survived to at least age 25 or age 45 the percentages
of IDs who never married are much lower (9.6% for females and 15.2% for males; 4.0% for
boys and 2.5% for girls, respectively).Time-varying and non-shared factors (such as birth order or parental
age) were not automatically captured by the model. Consequently, we
included controls for the observed non-shared factors of birth order
and the maternal age and the paternal age at the child's birth.
3. Results
Descriptive statistics are given in Table 2, the results of regression
analyses for the girls' age at ﬁrst marriage are given in Table 3, and the
results for the boys' age at ﬁrst marriage are given in Table 4. In the in-
terests of clarity, models I (minimal model) and IV (ﬁxed-effect model)
are not listed.
3.1. Paternal death and transition to ﬁrst marriage: strength of the effect
The (minimal) model AI, which controls for the child's birth cohort
and birth order, indicates that the death of the father decreases girls'
as well as boys' age at ﬁrst marriage (hazard ratio for girls=1.161**
and 1.114** for boys; data not shown). Similar results are generated
by model IIA, which includes further potential confounding covariates,
such as the family's socioeconomic status, the number of older and
younger brothers and sisters, the paternal age and the maternal age at
the child's birth, and maternal loss (model IIA; hazard ratios for girls=
1.165**, Table 3, and 1.096** for boys, Table 4). Model IIIA, which in-
cludes an interaction term between paternal absence and socioeconom-
ic status, indicates that there were general differences between the
social strata, but that there was no statistically signiﬁcant interaction
between paternal loss and socioeconomic status (p N .05; model IIIA,
see Table 3 for girls and Table 4 for boys). Moreover, the ﬁxed-effect ap-
proach that compares siblings does not contradict this ﬁnding (model
IVA; hazard ratios for girls =1.161* and 1.529** for boys; data not
shown). Thus, we ﬁnd strong evidence that paternal losswas associated
with earlier marriage for both boys and girls among the historical pop-
ulation of the Krummhörn region.
3.2. Timing of father absence
A comparison of models B, C, and D indicates that therewas a timing
effect of paternal loss on the offspring's age at ﬁrst marriage. Models BI,
BII, and BIV (Table 3) indicate that paternal loss before the age of ﬁve
was not associated with the girls' age at ﬁrst marriage. Models CI and
CII indicate that girls who experienced paternal loss between the ages
of ﬁve and 15 tended to marry earlier (hazard ratios 1.092+ and
1.097+, respectively), and models DI and DII indicate that paternal
loss after the age of 15 was signiﬁcantly associated with a decreased
age at ﬁrst marriage for girls (hazard ratios 1.137** and 1.137**, respec-
tively). Interestingly, the ﬁxed-effect models BIV, CIV, and DIV indicate
that only paternal loss between the ages of ﬁve and 15 was associated
with an earlier marriage for girls (Appendix Table A1; hazard ratio
1.283+). Similar results are indicated by models that estimate the
boys' age at ﬁrst marriage. Models BI, BII, BIV, CI, CII, and CIV (both
Table 4) indicate that neither the death of the father before the boys'
age ﬁve nor his death between the boys' agesﬁve and 15was associated
with the boys' age atﬁrstmarriage. However, models DI, DII, and DIV in-
dicate that boys who lost their father after the age of 15 married signif-
icantly earlier (hazard ratios 1.142**, 1.136** and 1.291*, respectively).
3.3. Social strata differentials
As expected based on the ﬁndings of the study by Willführ and
Störmer (2015), we found that the mean age at ﬁrst marriage varied
for both boys and girls depending on the individuals' social strata
(Table 2). Girls from small-scale farming families, landless families, or
families forwhom the landowning status ismissingmarried signiﬁcant-
ly later than girls in large-scale farming families (Table 3:model AII-DII).
The opposite is found for boys: boys from small-scale farming families,
Table 2
Descriptive statistics: Number of cases and mean ages at ﬁrst marriage.
GIRLS BOYS
N, born⁎ N, aged 15⁎ N, married⁎⁎
Mean age at
1st marriage
N, born⁎ N, aged 15⁎ N, married⁎⁎
Mean age at
1st marriage
Total 7853 3912 3238 26.340 (±5.367) 8291 3882 2908 28.911 (±5.759)
Large-scale farmers 787 451 386 25.011 (±5.259) 783 387 275 30.173 (±7.168)
Mid-scale farmers 780 407 351 25.560 (±5.905) 841 411 272 29.999 (±5.990)
Small-scale farmers 840 403 337 25.985 (±5.012) 898 388 279 29.345 (±6.096)
Landless 2939 1450 1197 26.729 (±5.215) 3235 1564 1203 28.276 (±5.304)
Unknown 2507 1201 967 26.794 (±5.393) 2534 1132 879 28.911 (±5.562)
N aged 15 Not married
before death
Ever
married
Mean age at
1st marriage
N aged 15 Not married
before death
Ever
married
Mean age at
1st marriage
No paternal loss 2049 299 1751 25.208 (±4.227)⁎⁎⁎ 1880 1425 455 27.657 (±4.761)⁎⁎⁎
Paternal loss 1863 376 1487 27.672 (±6.198)⁎⁎⁎ 2002 1483 519 30.116 (±6.349)⁎⁎⁎
No paternal loss before age 5 3710 636 3075 26.348 (±5.374) 3673 928 2745 28.933 (±5.763)
Paternal loss before age 5 202 39 163 26.172 (±5.248) 209 46 163 28.545 (±5.698)
No paternal loss between ages 5 and 15 3348 586 2763 26.377 (±5.393) 3296 826 2470 28.878 (±5.755)
Paternal loss between ages 5 and 15 564 89 475 26.123 (±5.647) 586 148 438 29.096 (±5.784)
No paternal loss after age 15 2832 431 2402 25.458 (±4.634) 2685 649 2036 28.029 (±5.103)
Paternal loss after age 15 1080 244 836 28.873 (±6.423) 1197 325 872 30.971 (±6.618)
⁎ - The differences between N born and N aged 15 are caused by both mortality and family emigration (end of observation).
⁎⁎ The differences between N aged 15 and N married are caused by both individual emigration (end of observation) and remaining single.
⁎⁎⁎ NB: Boys and girls who lost their father before marriage were older than those individuals whose father died after their marriage. However, this does not indicate that paternal loss is
linked to delayed marriage. The mean age differentials derive from an exposure bias. Individuals who married later in life were simply exposed for a longer period of time to the risk of
experiencing paternal death before marriage.
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ing were, on average, younger at their ﬁrst marriage than boys of the
wealthy elite (Table 4: model AII-DII). Despite these general differences
between the social strata, the models that include an interaction term
between paternal loss and socioeconomic status show that paternal
loss affected girls of different social strata differently, although these re-
sults are not statistically signiﬁcant (Table 3, model AIII-DIII). Given our
ﬁndings that none of the interaction terms is signiﬁcant and that the ef-
fects are stronger for daughters of mid-scale farmers than for daughters
of large-scale farmers, whereas the effect for daughters of landless
workers is smaller in models AIII and CIII but stronger in models BIII
and DIII, we argue that the results of the models III do not support the
hypothesis that landownership/wealthmoderated the effect of paternal
loss for girls.
The results for boys (Table 4) indicate that the impact of paternal
loss varied between boys of different social strata. Model AIII indicates
that sons of large-scale farmers married earlier when their father died
(hazard ratio = 1.223n.s). This effect was smaller for boys in landless
families (hazard ratio = 1.223n.s * 0.800+). Model BIII indicates that
sons of large-scale famers married signiﬁcantly earlier if the father
died before their ﬁfth birthday (hazard ratio = 1.808⁎. This effect was
signiﬁcantly smaller for boys of all other strata (hazard ratio = 1.808⁎
* 0.478+; * 0.520n.s; * 0.508⁎; * 0.570+ respectively). Interestingly,
model CIII indicates that the boys' age at ﬁrst marriage was higher
when the father died between their ﬁfth and 15th birthdays (hazard
ratio = 0.986n.s). Model DIII indicates that sons of large-scale farmers
married earlier when the father died after their 15th birthday (hazard
ratio = 1.134n.s). The effect was stronger for sons of mid- and small-
scale farmers and of families with unknown landowner status (hazard
ratio= 1.134n.s * 1.356+ s; * 1.131n.s; * 1.018n.s, respectively), whereas
the effect was smaller for sons of landless families (hazard ratio =
1.134n.s * 0.901n.s).With regard to boys, we argue that there is no strong
evidence that landownership/wealth moderated the effect of paternal
loss on the age at ﬁrst marriage, although there are some statically sig-
niﬁcant interactions. If wealth had played an important role we would
have expected to see a clear (linear) relationship between the extent
of landownership and effect size. What we observe, however, is that
the age at ﬁrst marriage among sons of mid- and small-scale farmers
was affected by paternal loss more strongly than the age at ﬁrst mar-
riage among sons of large-scale farmers. The ﬁnding that sons oflarge-scale farmers were signiﬁcantly affected by paternal loss before
their ﬁfth birthday will be addressed in the discussion.
3.4. Family differentials: sibship size and composition
General effects of having siblings on the age at ﬁrst marriage:
Models IIA-D and models IIIA-D indicate that sibling composition is
associated with the age at marriage, with girls being more affected
than boys (Tables 3 and 4). Girls' age at ﬁrst marriage was statistically
signiﬁcantly delayed by having older and younger brothers, as well as
by having older sisters. The ﬁxed-effect models IVA-D also indicate
that having older or younger brothers had a delaying effect, but in
these models the delaying effect of having older sisters was not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, and having younger sisters was even associated with a
decrease in the age at ﬁrstmarriage (Table 3). Boys' age atﬁrstmarriage
was statistically signiﬁcantly increased by the presence of older
brothers and of younger and older sisters, but this ﬁnding is not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant (Table 4). Whereas the ﬁxed-effect models IVA-D indi-
cate that having younger brothers was associated with earlier ﬁrst
marriage for boys, models IIA-D and IIIA-D indicate an opposite effect.
However, in nomodels is a statistically signiﬁcant association found be-
tween having younger brothers and boys' age at ﬁrst marriage.
The interaction between the paternal absence effect with sibship size
and sex composition:
To test whether the families' sibling composition acted as a modera-
tor on the effect of paternal loss on age at ﬁrst marriage, we reran
models IIIA-D and model IVA-D with interaction terms for the respec-
tive paternal loss dummy variables and time-varying information on
having (1) older brothers, (2) younger brothers, (3) older sisters, and
(4) younger sisters. The results of models VIIA-D (altered versions of
models IIIA-D) and model VIIIA-D (altered versions of models IVA-D;
also with family-ﬁxed-effects) are given in Table 5 for girls and
Table 6 for boys. Models VA-D and VIA-D indicate that there were
some moderator effects of the presence of siblings on boys' age at ﬁrst
marriage. Model VA indicates that boys with no siblings were younger
at their ﬁrst marriage if their father had died (hazard ratio = 1.211⁎),
and that this effect was weaker among boys with younger sisters (haz-
ard ratio= 1.211⁎ * 0.931+). The corresponding ﬁxed-effectmodel VIA
does not contradict this ﬁnding, although the results of this model are
not statistically signiﬁcant (hazard ratio = 1.270n.s. * 0.870n.s.).
Table 3
Results of the Cox regression models IIIA-D and IVA-D estimating girls' age at ﬁrst marriage and the interaction between paternal loss and social rank.
Model version
II II II II III III III III
A B C D A B C D
Family-ﬁxed-effects No No No No No No No No
Covariates
Father dies 1.167⁎⁎ 1.197+
Father dies before age 5 1.026 1.228
Father dies between ages 5 and 15 1.097+ 1.247
Father dies after age 15 1.137⁎⁎ 1.055
Interaction SES##father's death
Mid-scale farmers 1.058 1.396 1.014 1.071
Small-scale farmers 0.982 0.585 1.049 1.074
Landless 0.954 1.014 0.786 1.089
Unknown 0.964 0.756 0.876 1.101
SES
Large-scale farmers (REF.) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mid-scale farmers 0.964 0.952 0.952 0.956 0.947 0.956 0.951 0.939
Small-scale farmers 0.829⁎ 0.825⁎ 0.827⁎ 0.822⁎⁎ 0.836+ 0.842⁎ 0.829⁎ 0.807⁎
Landless 0.722⁎⁎ 0.722⁎⁎ 0.720⁎⁎ 0.722⁎⁎ 0.737⁎⁎ 0.725⁎⁎ 0.745⁎⁎ 0.706⁎⁎
Unknown 0.704⁎⁎ 0.718⁎⁎ 0.714⁎⁎ 0.719⁎⁎ 0.717⁎⁎ 0.732⁎⁎ 0.728⁎⁎ 0.701⁎⁎
Mother dies 1.155⁎⁎ 1.156⁎⁎ 1.157⁎⁎ 1.151⁎⁎ 1.157⁎⁎ 1.156⁎⁎ 1.160⁎⁎ 1.151⁎⁎
N, older brothers (alive) 0.904⁎⁎ 0.902⁎⁎ 0.903⁎⁎ 0.903⁎⁎ 0.904⁎⁎ 0.901⁎⁎ 0.901⁎⁎ 0.903⁎⁎
N, younger brothers (alive) 0.948⁎⁎ 0.943⁎⁎ 0.944⁎⁎ 0.942⁎⁎ 0.947⁎⁎ 0.943⁎⁎ 0.945⁎⁎ 0.941⁎⁎
N, older sisters (alive) 0.887⁎⁎ 0.884⁎⁎ 0.884⁎⁎ 0.886⁎⁎ 0.887⁎⁎ 0.885⁎⁎ 0.884⁎⁎ 0.886⁎⁎
N, younger sisters (alive) 0.977 0.970+ 0.972 0.969+ 0.977 0.970+ 0.973 0.969+
Paternal age
b20 0.685 0.683 0.685 0.680 0.700 0.682 0.695 0.677
20–30 (REF.) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
30–40 0.959 0.971 0.968 0.963 0.960 0.969 0.967 0.962
40–50 0.926 0.944 0.941 0.939 0.929 0.952 0.942 0.939
50–60 0.838 0.873 0.858 0.862 0.836 0.880 0.866 0.865
N60 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Unknown 0.951 0.969 0.964 0.963 0.951 0.967 0.965 0.962
Maternal age
b20 1.166 1.129 1.140 1.136 1.168 1.125 1.145 1.132
20–30 (REF.) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
30–35 0.984 0.980 0.979 0.984 0.984 0.977 0.979 0.986
35–45 0.874⁎ 0.870⁎ 0.874⁎ 0.864⁎ 0.874⁎ 0.865⁎ 0.875+ 0.864⁎
N45 0.972 0.968 0.976 0.944 0.972 0.961 0.975 0.941
Unknown 0.983 0.978 0.981 0.975 0.983 0.978 0.982 0.975
Birth cohort 1.005 1.003 1.004 1.003 1.004 1.003 1.003 1.003
Birth rank (1 = ﬁrst born) 1.025+ 1.028⁎ 1.026+ 1.025+ 1.025+ 1.027+ 1.028⁎ 1.026+
N, girls 7853 7853 7853 7853 7853 7853 7853 7853
N, failures (marriages) 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238
Observations 38,594 38,594 38,594 38,594 38,594 38,594 38,594 38,594
The hazard ratios are presented.
⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎ p b 0.05.
+ p b 0.1
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hazard ratio on paternal death between the ages of 5 and 15 was, al-
though greater than one, not statistically signiﬁcant (hazard ratio =
1.120 n.s.). Conditional on paternal loss for boys, the hazard ratio for
the presence of older sisters was statistically signiﬁcant and indicated
a later age at ﬁrst marriage (hazard ratio = 0.845**.) Model VD indi-
cates that having older sisters enhanced the accelerating effect of pater-
nal loss after boys' 15th birthday (hazard ratio = 1.114n.s. * 1.091 + ),
whereas the corresponding ﬁxed-effect model VID does not indicate
this effect of older sisters (hazard ratio = 1.395n.s. * 0.998n.s.). Model
VA indicates that having older brothers enhanced the accelerating effect
of paternal loss on girls' age at ﬁrst marriage (hazard ratio = 1.146+ *
1.086⁎). The corresponding ﬁxed-effect model VIA does not contradict
this ﬁnding, although the results are not statistically signiﬁcant (hazard
ratio = 1.453n.s. * 1.086n.s.). Model VC and the corresponding ﬁxed-
effect model VIC indicate consistently that girls married earlier when
the father died between their ﬁfth and 15th birthdays (hazard
ratio= 1.316** and 2.261*, respectively), and that this effect wasweak-
ened to a statistically signiﬁcant degree by the presence of younger
brothers (hazard ratios 1.316⁎⁎ * 0.890+ and 2.261⁎ * 0.726⁎, respec-
tively). Model VD indicates that for girls' age at ﬁrst marriage, thehazard ratio on paternal death after the 15th birthday was not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant (hazard ratio = 0.976 n.s.). Conditional on paternal
loss for girls, the hazard ratio for the presence of older brothers was sta-
tistically signiﬁcant and indicated an earlier age at ﬁrst marriage if the
father had died (hazard ratio = 1.143**). The corresponding ﬁxed-
effect model VID indicates that paternal loss after the age of 15 was as-
sociated with later marriage for girls if they had no siblings. The pres-
ence of younger brothers reduced this decelerating effect (hazard
ratio = 0.786n.s. * 1.255⁎). Note that ﬁxed-effect model IVD, which
does not include interaction terms for paternal loss after the age of 15,
and the presence of siblings indicate that paternal loss after the age of
15 was not associated with an increase in girls' age at ﬁrst marriage
(Table 3). In sum, we ﬁnd that paternal loss had an accelerating effect
on the age at ﬁrst marriage for both girls and boys. The ﬁxed-effect
models IVA-D indicate that this effect appears to be strong for boys
when the father died after the age of 15 and for girls when the father
died between their ﬁfth and 15th birthdays (Appendix-Table A1). We
also ﬁnd that the effect of paternal loss was moderated to some extent
by family socioeconomic status. However, the terms of interaction
were not statistically signiﬁcant in most cases, and did not support
the hypothesis that there was a continuous linkage between
Table 4
Results of the Cox regression models IIIA-D and IVA-D estimating boys' age at ﬁrst marriage.
Model version
II II II II III III III III
A B C D A B C D
Family-ﬁxed-effects No No No No No No No No
Covariates
Father dies 1.095⁎ 1.223
Father dies before age 5 1.013 1.808⁎
Father dies between ages 5 and 15 0.969 0.986
Father dies after age 15 1.136⁎⁎ 1.134
Interaction SES##father's death
Mid-scale farmers 1.082 0.478+ 0.931 1.356+
Small-scale farmers 1.068 0.520 1.202 1.131
Landless 0.800+ 0.508⁎ 0.939 0.901
Unknown 0.899 0.570+ 0.989 1.018
SES
Large-scale farmers (REF.) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mid-scale farmers 1.001 0.996 0.996 1.005 0.971 1.026 1.006 0.921
Small-scale farmers 1.225⁎ 1.221⁎ 1.220⁎ 1.224⁎ 1.196 1.251⁎ 1.192+ 1.177
Landless 1.522⁎⁎ 1.525⁎⁎ 1.525⁎⁎ 1.523⁎⁎ 1.699⁎⁎ 1.568⁎⁎ 1.537⁎⁎ 1.570⁎⁎
Unknown 1.404⁎⁎ 1.423⁎⁎ 1.428⁎⁎ 1.424⁎⁎ 1.484⁎⁎ 1.454⁎⁎ 1.428⁎⁎ 1.416⁎⁎
Mother dies 1.203⁎⁎ 1.206⁎⁎ 1.206⁎⁎ 1.202⁎⁎ 1.204⁎⁎ 1.204⁎⁎ 1.206⁎⁎ 1.201⁎⁎
N, older brothers (alive) 0.949⁎ 0.949⁎ 0.949⁎ 0.949⁎ 0.947⁎ 0.948⁎ 0.949⁎ 0.947⁎
N, younger brothers (alive) 0.993 0.991 0.990 0.988 0.992 0.991 0.990 0.987
N, older sisters (alive) 0.960 0.961 0.961 0.962 0.964 0.961 0.961 0.964
N, younger sisters (alive) 0.980 0.976 0.974 0.974 0.979 0.976 0.974 0.972
Paternal age
b20 1.659 1.661 1.673 1.714 1.727 1.690 1.674 1.715
20–30 (REF.) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
30–40 0.841⁎⁎ 0.847⁎⁎ 0.848⁎⁎ 0.843⁎⁎ 0.838⁎⁎ 0.849⁎⁎ 0.846⁎⁎ 0.841⁎⁎
40–50 0.721⁎⁎ 0.731⁎⁎ 0.733⁎⁎ 0.724⁎⁎ 0.717⁎⁎ 0.730⁎⁎ 0.730⁎⁎ 0.724⁎⁎
50–60 0.593⁎⁎ 0.610⁎⁎ 0.612⁎⁎ 0.594⁎⁎ 0.589⁎⁎ 0.614⁎⁎ 0.612⁎⁎ 0.586⁎⁎
N60 0.883 0.928 0.940 0.902 0.834 0.930 0.881 0.914
Unknown 0.827⁎⁎ 0.836⁎⁎ 0.838⁎⁎ 0.831⁎⁎ 0.823⁎⁎ 0.836⁎⁎ 0.838⁎⁎ 0.829⁎⁎
Maternal age
b20 1.489 1.491 1.489 1.491 1.491 1.491 1.486 1.505
20–30 (REF.) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
30–35 0.938 0.940 0.940 0.936 0.936 0.935 0.939 0.937
35–45 0.937 0.936 0.935 0.931 0.938 0.937 0.934 0.933
N45 1.282 1.300 1.289 1.218 1.224 1.295 1.302 1.188
Unknown 0.972 0.975 0.975 0.968 0.978 0.974 0.974 0.975
Birth cohort 1.000 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000
Birth rank (1 = ﬁrst born) 1.030⁎ 1.031⁎ 1.032⁎ 1.031⁎ 1.030⁎ 1.032⁎ 1.032⁎ 1.030⁎
N, boys 8291 8291 8291 8291 8291 8291 8291 8291
N, failures (marriages) 2908 2908 2908 2908 2908 2908 2908 2908
Observations 40,714 40,714 40,714 40,714 40,714 40,714 40,714 40,714
The hazard ratios are presented.
⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎ p b 0.05.
+ p b 0.1.
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the effect of paternal loss on the age at ﬁrst marriage among daughters
of large-scale farmers appears to have been weaker than the effect
among the daughters of mid-scale farmers, but stronger than the effect
on daughters of small-scale farmers or landless workers (model IIIA).
Interestingly, we see a clear impact on the age at ﬁrst marriage among
the sons of large-scale famers when the father died before age ﬁve
(model BIII; Table 4). Sibling composition also moderated the effect of
paternal loss. Whereas having brothers appears to have hastened the
accelerating impact of paternal loss on marriage among both boys and
girls, the effect of having sisters was less pronounced. In some models
the presence of sisters hastened the effect of paternal loss, whereas in
other models the effect was in the opposite direction.4. Discussion
As has been shown for many other historical, traditional, and mod-
ern populations, we ﬁnd for the population of the Krummhörn in the
18th and 19th centuries that paternal absence inﬂuenced the life histo-
ries of the father's children. In particular, we ﬁnd that the transition tothe generative life phase was accelerated. If the father died, his sons
and daughters married earlier on average than if he had survived.
Before we begin our discussion of this observation, it is perhaps
helpful to recall that the mean age at marriage differed between the so-
cial strata in this historic context. In general, the daughters of poorer
families tended to marry later than the daughters of richer households,
whereas the sons of wealthier families tended to marry later than their
poorer counterparts (Voland & Engel, 1990; Willführ & Störmer, 2015).
We interpret the social group-related age gap between women as hav-
ing been an outcome of a marriage market in which females were com-
peting to marry wealthy farmers, and these farmers preferred to marry
the youngest women. Even if the farmers married the daughters of la-
borers, these women would have been younger than the daughters of
laborers, who remained in the group of the landless after marriage
(Voland & Engel, 1990). However, there was a tendency toward social
endogamy, resulting in the observation that the daughters of farmers
married earlier than the daughters of laborers. On the other hand, the
sons of farmersmarried later than the sons of laborers because asmem-
bers of a resource-holding lineage, theyweremore exposed to the help-
er conﬂict, which was associated with a delay in marriage (see the
introduction for a more detailed explanation).
Table 5
Results of the Cox regression models VA-D and VIA-D estimating the age of girls at ﬁrst marriage and the interaction between paternal loss and the number of siblings alive.
Model version
V V V V VI VI VI VI
A B C D A B C D
Family-ﬁxed-effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates
Father dies 1.146+ 1.453
Father dies before age 5 1.120 0.613
Father dies between ages 5 and 15 1.316⁎⁎ 2.261⁎
Father dies after age 15 0.976 0.786
Interaction N sibs##father's death
#N older brothers 1.086⁎ 1.025 0.933 1.143⁎⁎ 1.086 1.215 0.900 1.096
#N younger brothers 0.982 0.868 0.890+ 1.034 1.165 1.611 0.726⁎ 1.255⁎
#N older sisters 0.986 0.930 0.936 1.049 0.866 1.023 0.839 1.015
#N younger sisters 0.978 0.855 0.993 0.987 0.908 0.532 0.931 1.017
SES n/a n/a n/a n/a
Large-scale farmers (REF.) 1 1 1 1
Mid-scale farmers 0.967 0.953 0.956 0.960
Small-scale farmers 0.827⁎ 0.825⁎ 0.830⁎ 0.826⁎
Landless 0.724⁎⁎ 0.724⁎⁎ 0.722⁎⁎ 0.723⁎⁎
Unknown 0.707⁎⁎ 0.720⁎⁎ 0.718⁎⁎ 0.719⁎⁎
Mother dies 1.155⁎⁎ 1.157⁎⁎ 1.159⁎⁎ 1.148⁎⁎ 1.324+ 1.326+ 1.321+ 1.347+
N, older brothers (alive) 0.867⁎⁎ 0.900⁎⁎ 0.915⁎⁎ 0.870⁎⁎ 0.661⁎⁎ 0.680⁎⁎ 0.709⁎⁎ 0.674⁎⁎
N, younger brothers (alive) 0.952⁎ 0.944⁎⁎ 0.954⁎ 0.933⁎⁎ 0.755⁎ 0.789+ 0.804+ 0.757⁎
N, older sisters (alive) 0.892⁎⁎ 0.888⁎⁎ 0.894⁎⁎ 0.876⁎⁎ 1.001 0.937 0.970 0.944
N, younger sisters (alive) 0.984 0.972 0.972 0.972 1.069 1.046 1.050 1.050
Paternal age
b20 0.675 0.683 0.681 0.690 0.611 0.586 0.586 0.599
20–30 (REF.) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
30–40 0.966 0.970 0.969 0.976 1.183 1.161 1.163 1.199
40–50 0.936 0.947 0.934 0.946 1.220 1.212 1.215 1.229
50–60 0.847 0.873 0.850 0.867 1.607 1.566 1.522 1.576
N60 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.135 1.000 0.368 0.368
Unknown 0.954 0.970 0.963 0.967 1.243 1.172 1.220 1.258
Maternal age
b20 1.136 1.129 1.149 1.126 1.098 1.055 1.089 1.079
20–30 (REF.) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
30–35 0.988 0.983 0.980 0.988 1.102 1.106 1.096 1.106
35–45 0.872⁎ 0.871⁎ 0.877+ 0.866⁎ 0.899 0.903 0.890 0.912
N45 0.981 0.969 0.998 0.983 1.118 1.079 1.081 1.128
Unknown 0.981 0.978 0.984 0.974 1.557 1.638 1.684 1.551
Birth cohort 1.004 1.003 1.004 1.003 1.102 1.136 1.105 1.129
Birth rank (1 = ﬁrst born) 1.024+ 1.027+ 1.025+ 1.025+ 0.952 0.972 0.961 0.967
N, girls 7853 7853 7853 7853 7853 7853 7853 7853
N, failures (marriages) 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238
Observations 38,594 38,594 38,594 38,594 38,594 38,594 38,594 38,594
The hazard ratios are presented.
⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎ p b 0.05.
+ p b 0.1.
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of why paternal death accelerates the transition to ﬁrstmarriage among
the offspring, and consider whether this ﬁnding is amenable to an adap-
tive interpretation. To address this question, we have compared three
evolutionarily informed explanation attempts and formulated expecta-
tions from their assumptions for the dataset available (Table 1). We
found almost no support for the psychosocial acceleration approach,
which is essentially based on the assumption that early paternal loss is
an indicator of a socially and ecologically insecure life course for the
child, and therefore leads to an acceleration of the child's own reproduc-
tion. Model BIII (Table 4), which examines the interaction between the
paternal absence effect and afﬁliation with a socioeconomic group, was
the only model that shows that the sons of large-scale farmers married
earlier if their father died before their ﬁfth birthday. We assume, how-
ever, that it was not the mechanism of psychosocial acceleration that
was responsible for this pattern, but rather the practice among these
farmers of ﬁlling a vacancy left by the death of a father of a young heir
with a “Setzwirt;” i.e., a temporary manager of the interests of the mi-
nors in the family (Swart, 1910). As the Setzwirt was an interim role
thatwas supposed to end as quickly as possible, the heir in such a family
tended tomarry earlier than average. For the age group 5–15 this effectwas not visible. We assume that this pattern is attributable to the prac-
tice of ultimogeniture: a boy who lost his father while under age ﬁve
was likely to have been the youngest son in the family, and thus the
intended successor to the family property. Although the percentage of
heirs among the older childrenmust have been lower for stochastic rea-
sons alone, the effects of their earlier marriage would have been lost
among the cases, and are therefore statistically invisible.
If a psychosocial accelerationwere taking place here, wewould have
found the same effect for the daughters of the prematurely deceased fa-
thers. Instead, the other timing effects we identiﬁed indicate that the
paternal absence effect was not present when the father died early in
the daughter's life, but was signiﬁcant if the father died when the
daughter was an adolescent or an adult. Therefore, the fundamental
prerequisite for the psychosocial acceleration explanation is not visible
in our models. However, this negative result in no way contradicts the
general validity of the psychosocial acceleration line of argumentation.
In an earlier study of the same population and two other historical sam-
ples from Finland and Canada, Störmer and Lummaa (2014) found that
it was not the personal experience of mortality, as measured by the
number of personally experienced deaths of siblings, that resulted in ac-
celerated marriage among the men studied; but rather the mortality
Table 6
Results of the Cox regression models VA-D and VIA-D estimating the age of boys at ﬁrst marriage and the interaction between paternal loss and the number of siblings alive.
Model version
V V V V VI VI VI VI
A B C D A B C D
Family-ﬁxed-effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates
Father dies 1.211* 1.270
Father dies before age 5 1.223 0.926
Father dies between ages 5 and 15 1.120 0.697
Father dies after age 15 1.114 1.395
Interaction N sibs##father's death
#N older brothers 0.999 0.913 1.000 1.023 1.076 0.856 1.055 1.047
#N younger brothers 0.983 0.733 1.048 0.981 1.140 1.783 1.138 1.014
#N older sisters 0.961 0.922 0.845⁎⁎ 1.091+ 1.071 1.211 1.074 0.998
#N younger sisters 0.931+ 1.131 0.927 0.950 0.870 0.974 1.129 0.839
SES n/a n/a n/a n/a
Large-scale farmers (REF.) 1 1 1 1
Mid-scale farmers 1.000 0.998 0.991 1.005
Small-scale farmers 1.226⁎ 1.222⁎ 1.221⁎ 1.226⁎
Landless 1.521⁎⁎ 1.525⁎⁎ 1.529⁎⁎ 1.517⁎⁎
Unknown 1.404⁎⁎ 1.418⁎⁎ 1.430⁎⁎ 1.431⁎⁎
Mother dies 1.207⁎⁎ 1.208⁎⁎ 1.210⁎⁎ 1.203⁎⁎ 1.365⁎ 1.422⁎ 1.410⁎ 1.388⁎
N, older brothers (alive) 0.950 0.956+ 0.950+ 0.944+ 0.774⁎ 0.813+ 0.798⁎ 0.798⁎
N, younger brothers (alive) 1.002 0.995 0.989 0.994 0.957 0.995 0.988 1.002
N, older sisters (alive) 0.981 0.965 0.990 0.938⁎ 0.775+ 0.785+ 0.789+ 0.795
N, younger sisters (alive) 1.009 0.976 0.985 0.986 1.014 0.957 0.959 1.000
Paternal age
b20 1.688 1.656 1.702 1.656 0.376 0.278 0.309 0.359
20–30 (REF.) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
30–40 0.840⁎⁎ 0.843⁎⁎ 0.846⁎⁎ 0.848⁎⁎ 0.983 0.969 0.949 0.966
40–50 0.718⁎⁎ 0.725⁎⁎ 0.731⁎⁎ 0.724⁎⁎ 1.041 1.029 1.014 1.028
50–60 0.594⁎⁎ 0.614⁎⁎ 0.621⁎⁎ 0.587⁎⁎ 0.690 0.726 0.709 0.716
N60 0.852 0.922 0.908 0.880 0.909 0.931 0.983 0.971
Unknown 0.827⁎⁎ 0.832⁎⁎ 0.834⁎⁎ 0.835⁎⁎ 1.725 1.673 1.616 1.637
Maternal age
b20 1.472 1.510 1.494 1.497 1.220 1.102 1.182 1.252
20–30 (REF.) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
30–35 0.944 0.937 0.945 0.939 1.022 1.012 1.004 1.020
35–45 0.944 0.935 0.943 0.928 1.132 1.151 1.147 1.132
N45 1.277 1.272 1.266 1.109 0.940 1.090 1.068 0.903
Unknown 0.975 0.977 0.980 0.972 0.700 0.731 0.719 0.674
Birth cohort 1.000 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.971 1.001 0.997 0.981
Birth rank (1 = ﬁrst born) 1.029+ 1.032⁎ 1.031⁎ 1.030⁎ 1.077 1.080 1.091 1.091
N, boys 8291 8291 8291 8291 8291 8291 8291 8291
N, failures (marriages) 2908 2908 2908 2908 2908 2908 2908 2908
Observations 40,714 40,714 40,714 40,714 40,714 40,714 40,714 40,714
The hazard ratios are presented.
⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎ p b 0.05.
+ p b 0.1.
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of older siblings that occurred before a man was born became a part of
his personal experience, and thus colored his family life and world
view. It is therefore possible that under the living conditions of the
Krummhörn, with its high mortality levels relative to those of modern
populations, the death of the fatherwas not enough to set the psychoso-
cial acceleration intomotion, and that the relevantmetricwas increased
mortality in the family, to which the early death of the father was a con-
tributor, but was not more important than other deaths in the family.
We have also found no clear support for the parent–offspring con-
ﬂict (POC) approach; i.e., the assumption that the parent–offspring con-
ﬂict subsides with the death of the father, which grants the children of
the deceased more reproductive autonomy. This argument would
have been supported by a ﬁnding that attributed a signiﬁcant recogniz-
ablemoderating role to the resources of the families. However, this out-
come is not visible in our models, possibly because in the Krummhörn
system of inheritance only a few of the children would have been sub-
ject to special expectations imposed on them by their father that
would conﬂict with their own marriage interests. As in many
European agrarian societies, it was also customary in the Krummhörn
to viewmarriage and the takeover of the parental farm as being relatedand to organize both events in amanner that was closely linked in time.
Therefore, the heir had to wait to marry until the father was willing to
withdraw from the business, which tended to postpone the age at
which the heir married. On the other hand, the heir's siblings had
much more autonomy with respect to their age at marriage, and there-
fore, were less exposed to the behavioral parent–offspring conﬂicts.
In view of the very small number of these cases, the effects of such
expectations could be diluted by the greater number of other cases.
Moreover, it cannot be conclusively determinedwhether the POCexpla-
nation applies to families who did not own land. Although the offspring
of landless laborers did not receive a material inheritance, it may be as-
sumed that unmarried sons and daughters were obliged to help their
family, and that their living father would have demanded that they con-
tribute. While the causes differ, both of these mechanisms could have
led to delayed marriage. This could explain why we found that the re-
sources of the family had no visible inﬂuence on paternal absence in
the models. Although additional differentiating analyses are needed to
settle this question, our initial conclusion is that the POC explanation at-
tempt is unlikely to prove useful in the interpretation of our models.
The observation that in theKrummhörn paternal loss had an acceler-
ating effect on marriage among the children in the family if the death
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able age tends to support the assumption that paternal loss and acceler-
ated marriage are closely and conditionally related, and that the
decision tomarry was often opportunistic. However, the negative result
with regard to the moderating role of the afﬁliation with a socioeco-
nomic group is somewhat unexpected. Even though the mean age at
ﬁrst marriage varies between the social groups, we do not ﬁnd any sig-
niﬁcant interaction with the paternal absence effect. A similar observa-
tion was made by Sheppard et al. (2014) in their study of Malaysia. In
their sample, parental wealth was a strong indicator of postponed mar-
riage. Interestingly, in their models paternal absence was associated
with amore rapid progression tomarriage, even if wealthwas included.
In theKrummhörn, the loss of the fatherwas obviously compensated for
by early marriage, through which a change in generations was effected.
It appears that this generational transfer occurred independently of the
family's social status. The culturally predominant concept of the family
and family dynamics may have been understood and cultivated in sim-
ilar ways across social strata, and stratum-speciﬁc demands may have
been subordinated to the pressure to adhere to this predominant
image of the family.
In particular, our ﬁnding that the sibling constellation had a moder-
ating inﬂuence tends to support the explanation that assumes that fam-
ily members were engaged in an ongoing opportunistic adjustment of
their reproductive decisions in response to the ever-changing family
composition. After the death of their father, the children in the family
who were of marriageable age may have been confronted with older
and younger siblings with two different and conﬂicting interests. On
the one hand, younger siblings may have required additional support
after the death of the father because themother could not fully compen-
sate for the loss of the father; while on the other, the older siblings may
have tried to compel the younger siblings to start their own families as
quickly as possible.
Furthermore, in most cases the widow remarried after the death of
her husband. To test whether the mother's remarriage, which entails
the presence of a stepfather in the household, inﬂuenced the accelera-
tion effect of paternal loss, we included the remarriage of the mother
as a time-varying covariate in the models (data not shown). As the re-
sults changed only marginally, we concluded that the presence of a
stepfather did not affect the consequences of paternal loss. However,
in line with the predictions of the theory of cooperative breeding sys-
tems, we assume that the mother's decision to remarry was not made
purely individualistically, but rather within the context of the family's
reproduction interests. Our methods were unable to further clarify ac-
cording to which precise criteria such decisions were made, or how
the adaptive functional logic of these decisions should be reconstructed.
It is, however, noticeable that the presence of older brothers hastened
the accelerating impact of paternal loss on marriages for both sons
and daughters. On the other hand, we found that the presence of older
sisters slowed down the paternal absence effect for their younger
brothers, and that, similarly, the presence of younger brothers slowed
down the paternal absence effect for their older sisters. These results
leave us with the impression that this sibling constellation generated a
degree of family stability that was also able to shield the family some-
what from the effects of paternal death. Through which precise mecha-
nisms these moderating roles in family dynamics of older brothers on
the one hand, and of older sisters and younger brothers on the other, op-
erated are questions that may be taken up by social historians. We cur-
rently lack the data that would be needed to enable us to gain a detailed
understanding of the adaptive background of the paternal loss effect. In
particular, we know little about how the often ambivalent relationships
between siblings, which tend to be characterized by simultaneous coop-
eration and competition (Nitsch, Faurie, & Lummaa, 2012; Pollet &
Hoben, 2011), were reﬂected in the real-life practices in the Krumm-
hörn (and elsewhere).
Another issue that arises when undertaking multiple testing for in-
teractions is false positive results. For both males and females we haveestimated 32 sibling (model V & VI) and 20 SES (model IV) interactions.
The risk of having at least a few false positives in such a study setup is
not negligible. We therefore want to emphasize that our conclusion
that opportunistic reproductive decision-making has the greatest ex-
planatory power is not based on just one or only a few statistically sig-
niﬁcant particular interactions terms, but on our ﬁnding that there
were several interactions with sibling composition and paternal loss,
and that therewas consistent interaction between paternal loss and SES.
From a behavioral ecology perspective, the transition to marriage is
also the transition from engaging in the intrafamilial helper strategy to
engaging in the breeder strategy. Therefore, taking into account exter-
nal cultural and socioeconomic factors as well would provide us with
a better understanding of the paternal absence effect. In particular, it
would be helpful to learn more about these adaptive mechanisms,
such as the compromise between helping and breeding found in family
networks. In looking at these issues, a number of questions arise. For ex-
ample, what regulating role do fathers play in these networks, andwhat
channels do paternal inﬂuences on the life histories of their children uti-
lize (Mattison, Scelza, & Blumenﬁeld, 2014; Shenk& Scelza, 2012; Shenk
et al., 2013;Winking, Gurven, & Kaplan, 2011)?Moreover, what role do
contextual factors—such as wealth, prestige, overall mortality, and inci-
dence of teenage pregnancy—play in the behavioralmanifestation of the
father role? The relationship between offspring and their mother could
also play an important role.We have includedmaternal loss as a control
variable in all the models, and we tested further whether maternal loss
exhibited a timing effect similar to that of paternal loss (see Tables A2 &
A3 in the appendix). We found that like paternal loss, maternal loss
later in childhood was associated with an earlier age at ﬁrst marriage
for both girls andboys. Studying the detailed relationship betweenmater-
nal loss and the children's age at marriage is, however, beyond the scope
of this study.
We have arrived at the conclusion that in the sample under study,
the opportunistic reproductive decision model stands out most clearly
with the greatest explanatory power. Nevertheless, we would like our
interpretation to be understood as a soft interpretation. The fact that
the predictions of alternative models are not as sharply differentiated
as one would wish for a hard, selective analysis serves as a warning
that there is a risk of unjustiﬁably over-interpreting the results.
Moreover, the three evolutionary explanation attempts do not mu-
tually exclude each other. On the contrary, we can assume that they in-
teract with each other depending on the situation and the context.
Therefore, it is not only conceivable but even very probable that each
of these attempts has varying effects for different sampleswith different
weightings, and that the effects may also differ between males and fe-
males. There are indications that the psychosocial acceleration explana-
tion has empirically broad and strong support in post-transitory,
modernwestern societies; i.e., in societies with comparatively lowmor-
tality and more resources (e.g., Brumbach et al., 2009; Chisholm,
Quinlian, Petersen, & Coall, 2005; Nettle, 2010). The accelerating effect
of early paternal death is not masked inmodern societies by other rele-
vant factors, such as a general increase inmortality. In pre-modern soci-
eties, by contrast, the circumstances tend to point in the direction of the
opportunistic adjustment explanation (Shenk et al., 2013; Sheppard
et al., 2014). Our analysis of the situation in the Krummhörn ﬁts into
this picture quite well. Nevertheless, there has to date been very little
broad quantitative research on the parent–offspring conﬂict explana-
tion attempt. Although it is applied occasionally in narrative and casuis-
tic approaches (Flinn, 1988; Gettler, McDade, Bragg, Feranil, & Kuzawa,
2015) this explanation's reach in real-life contexts and the strength of
its effects have so far been difﬁcult to assess reliably.Supplementary Materials
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.08.001.
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